Results for 'Merrilee H. Salmon'

975 found
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  1. Wesley Salmon, a memoir.Merrilee Salmon - 2005 - Enrahonar: Quaderns de Filosofía 37:11-16.
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  2. Ocean-based salmon farming: A case study of "irreversible damage".H. Orri Stefansson - forthcoming - Environmental Ethics.
    Ocean-based salmon farming, as presently practiced, is thought to pose an existential threat to what we today think of as wild salmon. This raises ethical questions about, first, the value of wild salmon, and, second, the value of wild salmon of the particular type that exists today. This essay uses the debate around ocean-based salmon farming as a case study of ‘irreversible damage’, a concept that figures heavily in environmental laws and regulations, in particular, in (...)
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  3. From Time to Time.Nathan Salmon - 2016 - In Shyam Wuppuluri & Giancarlo Ghirardi, Space, Time and Limits of Human Understanding. Cham: Springer. pp. 61-75.
    The topic is time travel of the sort depicted in H. G. Wells’ classic novel, The Time Machine—Wellsian time travel. The range of proper applicability of the concept of Wellsian time travel is investigated. The results of this investigation are applied to provide a new argument against the metaphysical possibility of time travel in absolute time. Alternatively, the argument is against the possibility of Wellsian time travel relative to a single temporal frame of reference. The argument leaves open the prospect (...)
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  4. Tense and Intension.Nathan Salmon - 2003 - In Aleksandar Jokić & Quentin Smith, Time, Tense, and Reference. MIT Press. pp. 107-154.
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  5. Modal Paradox: Parts and Counterparts, Points and Counterpoints.Nathan Salmon - 1986 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 11 (1):75-120.
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  6. Impossible Odds.Nathan Salmón - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (3):644-662.
    A thesis (“weak BCP”) nearly universally held among philosophers of probability connects the concepts of objective chance and metaphysical modality: Any prospect (outcome) that has a positive chance of obtaining is metaphysically possible—(nearly) equivalently, any metaphysically impossible prospect has zero chance. Particular counterexamples are provided utilizing the monotonicity of chance, one of them related to the four world paradox. Explanations are offered for the persistent feeling that there cannot be chancy metaphysical necessities or chancy metaphysical impossibilities. Chance is objective but (...)
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  7. Interview with Nathan Salmon.Nathan Salmon & Christian de León - 2018 - Colloquy 2018 (3):19-20.
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  8. Lambda in Sentences with Designators.Nathan Salmon - 2010 - Journal of Philosophy 107 (9):445–468.
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  9. Nonexistence.Nathan Salmon - 1998 - Noûs 32 (3):277-319.
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  10. The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly.Nathan Salmon - 2004 - In Marga Reimer & Anne Bezuidenhout, Descriptions and beyond. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 230--260.
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  11. Julius Caesar and the Numbers.Nathan Salmón - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (7):1631-1660.
    This article offers an interpretation of a controversial aspect of Frege’s The Foundations of Arithmetic, the so-called Julius Caesar problem. Frege raises the Caesar problem against proposed purely logical definitions for ‘0’, ‘successor’, and ‘number’, and also against a proposed definition for ‘direction’ as applied to lines in geometry. Dummett and other interpreters have seen in Frege’s criticism a demanding requirement on such definitions, often put by saying that such definitions must provide a criterion of identity of a certain kind. (...)
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  12. Interview with Nathan Salmon, Univeristy of California, Santa Barbara.Nathan Salmon & Leslie F. Wolfe - 2008 - Yale Philosophy Review 2008 (4):78-90.
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  13. The Logic of What Might Have Been.Nathan Salmon - 1989 - Philosophical Review 98 (1):3-34.
    The dogma that the propositional logic of metaphysical modality is S5 is rebutted. The author exposes fallacies in standard arguments supporting S5, arguing that propositional metaphysical modal logic is weaker even than both S4 and B, and is instead the minimal and weak metaphysical-modal logic T.
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  14. Existence.Nathan Salmon - 1987 - Philosophical Perspectives 1:49-108.
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  15. A Theory of Bondage.Nathan Salmon - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (4):415-448.
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  16. Illogical Belief.Nathan Salmon - 1989 - Philosophical Perspectives 3:243-285.
    A sequel to the author’s book /Frege’s Puzzle/ (1986).
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  17. Assertion and Incomplete Definite Descriptions.Nathan U. Salmon - 1982 - Philosophical Studies 42 (1):37--45.
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  18. Tense and Singular Propositions.Nathan Salmon - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein, Themes From Kaplan. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 331--392.
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  19. The Resilience of Illogical Belief.Nathan Salmon - 2006 - Noûs 40 (2):369–375.
    Although Professor Schiffer and I have many times disagreed, I share his deep and abiding commitment to argument as a primary philosophical tool. Regretting any communication failure that has occurred, I endeavor here to make clearer my earlier reply in “Illogical Belief” to Schiffer’s alleged problem for my version of Millianism.1 I shall be skeletal, however; the interested reader is encouraged to turn to “Illogical Belief” for detail and elaboration. I have argued that to bear a propositional attitude de re (...)
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  20. A Millian Heir Rejects the Wages of Sinn.Nathan Salmon - 1990 - In C. Anthony Anderson & Joseph Owens, Propositional Attitudes: The Role of Content in Language, Logic, and Mind. CSLI Publications. pp. 215-247.
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  21. Relative and Absolute Apriority.Nathan Salmon - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 69 (1):83 - 100.
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  22. Demonstrating and Necessity.Nathan Salmon - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (4):497-537.
    My title is meant to suggest a continuation of the sort of philosophical investigation into the nature of language and modality undertaken in Rudolf Carnap’s Meaning and Necessity and Saul Kripke’s Naming and Necessity. My topic belongs in a class with meaning and naming. It is demonstratives—that is, expressions like ‘that darn cat’ or the pronoun ‘he’ used deictically. A few philosophers deserve particular credit for advancing our understanding of demonstratives and other indexical words. Though Naming and Necessity is concerned (...)
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  23. Being of Two Minds: Belief with Doubt.Nathan Salmon - 1995 - Noûs 29 (1):1-20.
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  24. Reflexivity.Nathan Salmon - 1986 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 27 (3):401-429.
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  25. Recurrence Again.Nathan Salmon - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (2):445-457.
    Kit Fine has replied to my criticism of a technical objection he had given to the version of Millianism that I advocate. Fine evidently objects to my use of classical existential instantiation in an object-theoretic rendering of his meta-proof. Fine’s reply appears to involve both an egregious misreading of my criticism and a significant logical error. I argue that my rendering is unimpeachable, that the issue over my use of classical EI is a red herring, and that Fine’s original argument (...)
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  26. Is de re Belief Reducible to de dicto?Nathan Salmon - 1997 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 27 (sup1):85-110.
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  27. Vagaries about Vagueness.Nathan Salmon - 2010 - In Richard Dietz & Sebastiano Moruzzi, Cuts and clouds: vagueness, its nature, and its logic. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  28. Recurrence.Nathan Salmon - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 159 (3):407-441.
    Standard compositionality is the doctrine that the semantic content of a compound expression is a function of the semantic contents of the contentful component expressions. In 1954 Hilary Putnam proposed that standard compositionality be replaced by a stricter version according to which even sentences that are synonymously isomorphic (in the sense of Alonzo Church) are not strictly synonymous unless they have the same logical form. On Putnam’s proposal, the semantic content of a compound expression is a function of: (i) the (...)
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  29. A Paradox about Sets of Properties.Nathan Salmón - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):12777-12793.
    A paradox about sets of properties is presented. The paradox, which invokes an impredicatively defined property, is formalized in a free third-order logic with lambda-abstraction, through a classically proof-theoretically valid deduction of a contradiction from a single premise to the effect that every property has a unit set. Something like a model is offered to establish that the premise is, although classically inconsistent, nevertheless consistent, so that the paradox discredits the logic employed. A resolution through the ramified theory of types (...)
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  30. Impossible Worlds.Nathan Salmon - 1984 - Analysis 44 (3):114 - 117.
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  31. Modal Paradox II: Essence and Coherence.Nathan Salmón - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (10):3237-3250.
    Paradoxes of nested modality, like Chisholm’s paradox, rely on S4 or something stronger as the propositional logic of metaphysical modality. Sarah-Jane Leslie’s objection to the resolution of Chisholm’s paradox by means of rejection of S4 modal logic is investigated. A modal notion of essence congenial to Leslie’s objection is clarified. An argument is presented in support of Leslie’s crucial but unsupported assertion that, on pain of inconsistency, an object’s essence is the same in every possible world. A fallacy in the (...)
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  32. Singular Concepts.Nathan Salmón - 2024 - Synthese 204 (20).
    Toward a theory of n-tuples of individuals and concepts as surrogates for Russellian singular propositions and singular concepts. Alonzo Church proposed a powerful and elegant theory of sequences of functions and their arguments as singular-concept surrogates. Church’s account accords with his Alternative (0), the strictest of his three competing criteria for strict synonymy. The currently popular objection to strict criteria like (0) on the basis of the Russell-Myhill paradox is misguided. Russell-Myhill is not a problem specifically for Alternative (0). Rather (...)
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  33. How to Measure the Standard Metre.Nathan Salmon - 1988 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 88 (1):193 - 217.
    Nathan Salmon; XII*—How to Measure the Standard Metre, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 88, Issue 1, 1 June 1988, Pages 193–218.
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  34. Two Conceptions of Semantics.Nathan Salmon - 2004 - In Zoltan Gendler Szabo, Semantics Versus Pragmatics. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 317-328.
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  35. The Limits of Human Mathematics.Nathan Salmon - 2001 - Noûs 35 (s15):93 - 117.
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  36. A Note on Kripke’s Paradox about Time and Thought.Nathan Salmon - 2013 - Journal of Philosophy 110 (4):213-220.
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  37. Reflections on Reflexivity.Nathan Salmon - 1992 - Linguistics and Philosophy 15 (1):53 - 63.
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  38. On Content.Nathan Salmon - 1992 - Mind 101 (404):733-751.
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  39. The Philosopher's Stone and Other Mythical Objects.Nathan Salmon - 2015 - In Stuart Brock & Anthony Everett, Fictional Objects. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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  40. Analyticity and Apriority.Nathan Salmon - 1993 - Philosophical Perspectives 7:125-133.
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  41. Numbers versus Nominalists.Nathan Salmon - 2008 - Analysis 68 (3):177–182.
    A nominalist account of statements of number (e.g., ‘There are exactly two moons of Mars’) is rebutted.
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  42. My Philosophical Education.Nathan Salmón - manuscript
    In this candid autobiographical essay, Nathan Salmon recounts and assesses the impact of various philosophers and events on his philosophical development.
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  43. Three Perspectives on Quantifying In.Nathan Salmon - 2010 - In Robin Jeshion, New Essays on Singular Thought. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 64.
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  44. That F.Nathan Salmon - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 141 (2):263 - 280.
    Jeffrey King's principal objection to the direct-reference theory of demonstratives is analyzed and criticized. King has responded with a modified version of his original argument aimed at establishing the weaker conclusion that the direct-reference theory of demonstratives is either incomplete or incorrect. It is argued that this fallback argument also fails.
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  45. Fiction, Myth, and Reality.Nathan Salmon - 2010 - In Alan Berger, Saul Kripke. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. pp. 49-77.
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  46. The Fact that x = y.Nathan Salmon - 1987 - Philosophia 17 (4):517-518.
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  47. Three Perspectives on Quantifying In.Nathan Salmon - 2010 - In Robin Jeshion, New Essays on Singular Thought. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 64.
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  48. A Problem in the Frege-Church Theory of Sense and Denotation.Nathan Salmon - 1993 - Noûs 27 (2):158-166.
    There is an inconsistency among claims made (or apparently made) in separate articles by Alonzo Church concerning Frege's distinction between sense and denotation taken together with plausible assertions by Frege concerning his notion of ungerade Sinn-i.e., the sense that an expression allegedly takes on in positions in which it has ungerade Bedeutung, denoting its own customary sense. As with any inconsistency, the difficulty can be avoided by relinquishing one of the joint assumptions from which contradiction may be derived. Yet what (...)
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  49. Points, complexes, complex points, and a yacht.Nathan Salmon - 2008 - In Nicholas Griffin & Dale Jacquette, Russell Vs. Meinong: The Legacy of "on Denoting". London and New York: Routledge.
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  50. Proper Names and Descriptions.Nathan Salmon - 2006 - In John Corcoran, Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2nd edition. macmillan.
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